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The American Law Institute ("ALI") initiated a project in 2010 to pro-
pose the Principles of the Law of Liability Insurance ("Principles"). A Prin-
ciples project by the ALI is different from a Restatement of Law, for which
the ALI is better known. A Restatement seeks to restate the common law of
the fifty U.S. jurisdictions in systematized form. The ALI was organized
many decades ago to achieve this ambition, in particular to counter the criti-
cism that varying common law principles in the many different states in the
U.S. made the law confused and contradictory across the states.' The ALI has
been successful and has published many volumes of Restatements over the
succeeding years, generally disproving this point.
A Principles project of the ALI is different. A Principles project pro-
poses to state the law "as it should be," presumably as discussion material or
talking points for lawyers and academics to address over some time in the
future. Toward this end, the ALI contracted with two law professors, Tom
Baker of Pennsylvania and Kyle Logue of Michigan, to commence a defini-
tion of these "Principles."2 Both scholars are known for their very strong ad-
vocacy of policyholders' rights in liability insurance markets.3 The "Princi-
ples of the Law of Liability Insurance" that these two scholars announced
weighed heavily toward changing the law to benefit policyholders. There was
controversy over these proposals, though the members of the ALI approved
the first two volumes of the Principles project.
* Edward J. Phelps Professor of Law and Economics, Yale Law School. This project has been
supported by a grant from the American Insurance Association. The Association and its members have
had no influence on the ideas expressed in this paper and may, very well, disagree with them. The views
expressed here are totally my own and draw from earlier writings.
1 See George L. Priest, The Curious Treatment of Capitalism in Legal Education, 49 SOC'Y 216,
218 (2012).
2 1 view myself as a friend of both Professor Baker and Professor Logue; Logue more seriously:
he attended a class of mine at Yale and was an intramural basketball teammate (he is a very good basket-
ball player).
3 See generally, e.g., TOM BAKER & KYLE D. LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND
MATERIALS (3d ed. 2013) (collecting pro-policyholder cases from across jurisdictions (I taught the previ-
ous edition of the book.))
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For reasons that are not totally clear, in August 2014, before the Princi-
ples project was completed and before extensive discussion of the rule
changes that had been recommended in the parts of the Principles that had
been completed, especially in the academic literature, the ALI decided to
change the project from a statement of aspired-to (by the Reporters) "Princi-
ples" to a Restatement of the Law.4 The ALI continued to retain Professors
Baker and Logue as Reporters to prepare this Restatement.' It is not evident
what the ALI's earlier approval of the first two chapters of the Principles
project has on its consideration of the revised chapters in the proposed Re-
statement. More recently, in April 2015, the ALI recast the proposed Restate-
ment as a Discussion Draft for discussion by its members at a forthcoming
meeting.6
Although the Reporters have toned down some of their earlier aspira-
tions reflected in the partial Principles draft, again in the proposed Restate-
ment, and yet again in the Restatement Discussion Draft, it remains a strik-
ingly pro-policyholder7 statement, not generally reflective of the law in the
various U.S. jurisdictions.8 The Reporters justify this approach chiefly on two
grounds: first, that policyholders do not read policies and so are in ignorance
of the terms imposed upon them by insurers;9 and, second, by the invocation
of the "objectives of the underlying liability regime, which may depend on
the presence of liability insurance," or by the invocation of "special consid-
erations of insurance law."'" By this, the Reporters appear to mean that, if
there is a loss, it should be covered by insurance to pay for it."
This approach is not quite a principle, and surely not a restatement. It is
an idea about the redistribution of risks. To my mind, the Reporters' central
understanding of insurance is that it serves simply to redistribute risks from
persons who have suffered a loss to persons who have not. This conception
4 See American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance Preliminary Draft
No. I iv (March 2, 2015), http://www.nge.com/files/Uploads/Images/ALIDraft.pdf [hereafter Restate-
ment PD No. I].
5 Id.
6 See American Law Institute, Comparison: Principles of the Law of Liability Insurance TD No. 1,
Chapter I (revised after 2015 Annual Meeting) to Restatement of the Law, Liability Insurance Discussion
Draft (April 30, 2015) [hereafter Discussion Draft].
7 Of course, there are persons or entities insured under a policy who are not the original policy-
holders. I will use the terms "policyholder" and "insured" interchangeably, so as to limit the extent to
which readers must pay attention to the last letter of the term "insured." Mr. Eugene Anderson convinced
me of this approach.
8 This paper is meant to be conceptual and will not specifically address differences between the
proposed rules and the law in the several jurisdictions. As shall be occasionally indicated, there are many
differences.
9 They extend this explanation even to a wide range of commercial policyholders.
10 Discussion Draft, supra note 6 at 68, 160. Page numbers in the Discussion Draft refer to the
redlined version.
11 See, e.g., BAKER & LOGUE, supra note 3, at 17-24, for an elaboration of this point.
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provides grounds for a very large expansion of insurance in favor of policy-
holders who have suffered loss, as reflected in each of these documents. As
I shall explain, however, the idea of insurance as centrally a redistribution of
risks is innocent of the economic reasons that insurance serves to reduce the
costs of risks in the society.
Not all risks can be insured. Some risks are more effectively reduced by
the policyholder than by the insurer. Other risks, for economic reasons, can-
not be effectively insured. From an economic standpoint, an insurance con-
tract represents a joint allocation as between the policyholder and insurer as
to how best to minimize the risks that the policyholder faces in the context
of the risks that the insurer can effectively reduce. Insurance policies allocate
responsibilities in these ways. The Reporters do not seriously consider insur-
ance as a market activity.
As shall be explained, I have no animus to policyholders.2 The Restate-
ment Reporters' apparent understanding of insurance as simply risk shifting,
however, ignores the economics of the provision of insurance. It ignores what
risks a policyholder is willing to pay an insurer to cover-as opposed to what
risks the policyholder may more effectively bear-and it ignores the related-.
point that some risks cannot be effectively borne by insurers or, more accu-
rately, effectively borne at premiums a policyholder is willing to bear.
The most important objective of the law governing liability insurance is
to maximize the availability of insurance, which helps all of society, but es-
pecially those with a low income. The question then is, will the rules that the
Reporters have advocated in the proposed Restatement or the Restatement
Discussion Draft accomplish that end? It is my view that the Reporters' ap-
proach even in the Restatement Discussion Draft will have the economic ef-
fect of reducing the ability of citizens to acquire insurance.
Part I discusses the economics of insurance with some references to the
Restatement Discussion Draft. Part II discusses the rules advocated in the
Restatement Discussion Draft in greater detail.
I. How LIABILITY INSURANCE OPERATES
I take it as axiomatic that the most compelling principle for considering
rules governing insurance contracts is to design those rules so as to maximize
the availability of insurance coverage to the society.
Insurance is an important service in a society because it allows individ-
uals and entities to engage in activities generating risk in which they other-
wise might not engage or might engage in differently in the absence of insur-
ance. It thus expands the opportunities for all to enrich their lives. As simple
examples, few of us would drive on open highways or drive the way all of us
do if not protected from the calamity of a potential loss from an accident by
12 1 have testified on behalf of policyholders as an expert witness in many cases, though more fre-
quently on behalf of insurers.
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the availability of auto insurance. Similarly, our houses would be designed
differently-perhaps with much greater levels of physical protection-if not
for the availability of homeowners' insurance. Commercial entities in partic-
ular could not engage in risky activities providing valuable products and ser-
vices to consumers without the availability of commercial general liability
insurance. Employees would make different work decisions if not protected
by employers' insurance coverage. Insurance vastly increases the opportuni-
ties of a society to enhance the lives and the positions of its citizens. It could
be argued, though to my knowledge it has not yet been shown, that the great
productivity of the U.S. over other countries importantly derives. from its
well-developed insurance market.
The economic alternative to insurance is the prevention of loss or, where
losses still occur, savings to compensate for them.3 Savings is a means of
protecting against future liabilities or economic calamities. All of us retain
savings to address some level of personal calamities, so savings remain an
important part of each family's and entity's economic planning. But savings,
from an economic standpoint, is an inferior-by which I mean more costly-
means to deal with losses than insurance, where insurance can effectively
reduce the financial impact of losses. Today, in the U.S., a person can acquire
$300,000 worth of auto liability insurance for a few hundred dollars a year
as protection in case the person or a member of the family causes an accident.
Compare the costs to the family of maintaining $300,000 in an auto accident
savings reserve, not to mention the costs of maintaining reserves for the po-
tential costs of homeowners' liabilities, the death of a family member, or
other potential liabilities relating to the activities in which family members
engage. This is true for commercial entities as well, however well diversified
they or their shareholders may be. And the point is especially true for low-
income individuals or families who might never be able to acquire equivalent
savings amounts. Insurance for potential losses is far less costly. The impli-
cation of these points for a society is to increase the availability of insurance
to the extent possible.
As I will explain, however, there are limits-defined by economic real-
ities-as to what risks can be effectively insured, as opposed to suffered di-
rectly by the policyholder because there is no advantage to insurance. Many
risks are not insurable in the market because the policyholder can more ef-
fectively protect against them. This is a simple, but central, economic point.
As I shall explain, there are other economic reasons that prevent the effective
insurance of risks. But if risks can be insured, a market concept, insurance is
a far more effective means to protect oneself from future economic liabilities
than savings. For many centuries, savings have served as the principal means
of protection from potential economic losses. The modern age has been pro-
pelled by insurance.
13 This analysis is elaborated in George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90
YALE L. J. 1297, 1308 (1981) (hereafter Priest, Consumer Product Warranty].
[VOL. 24:635
A PRINCIPLED APPROACH TOWARD INSURANCE LAW
The principal question, then, is how to design rules for the administra-
tion of insurance contracts to maximize insurance availability. I have men-
tioned insurance availability to allow individuals to undertake risky activi-
ties. Again, this point is especially true for the low income in the society who,
if insurance premiums are low, may acquire insurance that might not other-
wise be available. This makes it possible for those that might be crippled by
potential economic catastrophes to engage in a wide range of everyday activ-
ities.
With respect to the laws governing insurance contracts, it follows that
any change in these rules that reduces mutual costs as between insurers and
policyholders serves to reduce the cost of insurance and increases insurance
availability to the benefit of all, but especially of the low income.
Insurance contracts, like other contracts, are designed to provide a ser-
vice at a price (premium) to make use of the relative comparative advantages
of the insurer and the policyholder. If a policyholder is in a position to reduce
loss (by prevention) at a lower cost than what the insurer would charge for
coverage of the loss, it is to the advantage of both parties for the policyholder
to do so. This reduces insurance premiums and expands the availability of
insurance. In other contexts, some risks cannot be effectively reduced by in-
surance, as will be explained." Most insurance policy provisions can be ex-
plained on these grounds. The drafters of the proposed Restatement and the
Restatement Discussion Draft consistently avoid these propositions.
This Part presents an economic analysis of the provision of insurance.
These principles are well known and are uncontroversial. There is nothing
new in this analysis, except that much of it has been ignored in the insurance
literature and, in particular, by the drafters of the proposed Restatement.
Much of the (especially) legal description of insurance refers to it as a
mechanism of "spreading risks." This is not quite inaccurate, but it can be
understood in a way that misdiagnoses the economic purpose of insurance to
reduce the effects of risk through statistical and economic means. The
"spreading risks" explanation can be interpreted to mean that spreading risks
is chiefly a redistributional mechanism, charging people who have not suf-
fered a loss with the costs faced by those who have. This form of "spreading
risks" is typically justified on the principle of equalizing marginal utilities of
wealth or shifting assets from the more risk averse to the risk neutral or risk
preferring. In my view, much of the impetus for the changes in law recom-
mended by the drafters of the proposed Restatement and the Restatement
Discussion Draft derives from a view that insurance is basically a redistribu-
tional instrument. Most of the changes in law that the drafters have adopted
seek to shift the distribution as between insurers and policyholders in favor
of policyholders. I do not disregard or diminish the interests of policyholders.
But these efforts to overturn the terms of basic liability insurance policies
will serve to reduce insurance availability in the society.
14 See id. at 1318 (elaborated here).
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True insurance goes far beyond redistributing economic positions of cit-
izens based on the principle of the declining marginal utility of wealth or on
the basis of differential risk aversion. One can argue about whether ideas
about the declining marginal utility of wealth should overcome contractual
agreements between policyholders and insurers. Similarly, the risk aversion
explanation is not totally convincing. From an economic standpoint, insur-
ance can be offered to a risk pool containing all risk-averse individuals pro-
vided by an entity that itself is risk averse.
On economic grounds, true insurance serves in various ways to reduce
the actual risk level, something not achieved by simple redistribution among
policyholders or as between the risk averse and risk neutral.
There are three principal features of the operation of insurance that de-
termine the extent to which an insurance regime effectively reduces the risk
level: the aggregation of risks, the segregation of risks into separate risk
pools, and the control of moral hazard through deductibles, coinsurance, and
exclusions of coverage.5
A. The Aggregation of Risks
Insurance operates where losses have some stochastic or probabilistic
character.6 Losses that are certain to occur in some particular period cannot
be insured against; one can only accumulate savings before the loss occurs
or after the loss is suffered to restore the previous economic position. Imagine
a commercial policyholder who seeks coverage after the fact for liabilities
deriving from mesothelioma deaths suffered at its plant. Or imagine a person
whose house has burned down seeking subsequent insurance coverage for
the loss. There is no point to such insurance.
Similarly, losses cannot be effectively insured if they can be prevented
at low cost by the policyholder.7 It would be uneconomic for a policyholder
to pay an insurer to estimate the risk, to maintain reserves for it, and to engage
in subsequent loss adjustment where the policyholder can cheaply prevent
the loss.
In contrast, for insurance to reduce the risk level, the policyholder losses
must be probabilistic, either as to whether or not the losses will occur at all
(for example, whether a product will prove defective or a house will burn
15 George L. Priest, Government Insurance versus Market Insurance, 28 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK
& INS. 71, 76 (2003) [hereafter Priest, Government Insurance]. There is a fourth risk-reduction function
of insurance relating to the investment of insurance premiums. For a discussion, see George L. Priest,
Compensation for Injury in the United States, in COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN SWEDEN AND
OTHER COUNTRIES 127, 131-32 (Carl Oldertz & Eva Tidefelt, eds., 1988). This function is not implicated
by the liability rules in the proposed Restatement and Restatement Discussion Draft.
16 1 apologize for the great deal of economics in this discussion, but its relation to the insurance
liability rule changes in the proposed Restatement and Restatement Discussion Draft will become obvious
in Part II, infra.
17 See generally Priest, Consumer Product Warranty, supra note 13 for many examples.
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down) or as to when losses certain to occur actually will occur (for example,
whether one will die before or after full life expectancy).
For a loss or a set of losses to be probabilistic means that the occurrence
of the loss can be described by a probability distribution. The mean of the
distribution represents the most likely probability of occurrence of the loss;
the distribution or error term surrounding the mean represents he greater or
lesser likelihood that the loss or set of losses will occur. The expected cost of
the loss is determined by summing the amount of the loss weighted by these
probabilities. Obviously, regardless of the mean expected magnitude of the
loss, the broader the probability distribution around the mean, the greater the
total expected cost. More precisely, expected cost is determined by the vari-
ance of the distribution around the mean. The variance of the distribution
measures the risk associated with the loss.8
Insurance can reduce the risk of losses by aggregating uncorrelated
losses. To the degree that losses are uncorrelated (that is, statistically inde-
pendent),'" aggregation will reduce variance by leading the error terms of the
risks to cancel out. Aggregation does not change the extent of underlying
loss. But the cumulative risk of loss, measured by the variance of the distri-
bution, can be reduced by aggregation, again, to the extent that the individual
risks are statistically independent. For statistically independent risks, the sum
of the aggregated risks is less than the sum of the risks taken individually.
This is one of the central differences between true insurance and insurance
as "risk spreading." Risk spreading does not reduce the magnitude of loss.
True insurance does.2 °
The risk-reducing function of aggregation derives from operation of the
law of large numbers-the empirical phenomenon according to which the
probability density function of a loss tends to become concentrated around
the mean as the sample number increases.2' The law of large numbers implies
that as one increases the number of policyholders possessing independent and
identically valued risks, one also increases the accuracy of prediction of the
risk generated by each individual. The increase in predictive accuracy is im-
portant to the operation of insurance and derives from the reduction in the
variance of risk of expected outcomes.
Some scholars who have employed the term "law of large numbers" to
refer to the insurance function seem to have understood large numbers as
18 The variance of a distribution is the sum of the squares of the differences between the mean of
the distribution and each random variable: variance = 62 = E (X- x)2, where x = the mean of the distribution
and X = each random variable.
19 Losses are statistically independent to the extent that the occurrence of one loss does not affect
the probability of occurrence of the other.
20 See Priest, Government Insurance, supra note 15, at 73.
21 See John M. Marshall, Insurance Theory: Reserves Versus Mutuality, 12 EcON. INQUIRY 476,
484-85 (1974).
2017]
GEO. MASON L. REV.
relevant only for broad loss-spreading, rather than for risk-reduction." It is
important, however, to distinguish between employing a large population of
policyholders to shift losses based on assumptions concerning utility levels
or distributional preference and employing a large population of policyhold-
ers to reduce the risk level by canceling out risk terms. The important differ-
ence is that, to the extent that the losses and accompanying risks are truly
independent, their aggregation not only spreads them, diminishing the impact
of a loss on an individual policyholder, but also reduces the total risk level of
the pool below the pre-aggregated sum of individual risks.
Loss spreading, in contrast, serves only a distributional end. Spreading
does not change the risk level; it merely distributes existing risks across a set
of the population different from the set that faced the risks in the first in-
stance. The operation of the law of large numbers on statistically independent
risks, in contrast, increases the ability to predict the risk level (which is what
is meant by canceling out risk terms) and thus reduces the effective risk
level.23
The law of large numbers will not apply, however, if the risks faced by
members of the pool are not statistically independent o some degree. Aggre-
gating such risks would be unproductive because the savings reserves an in-
surer would have to maintain would equal or, perhaps, exceed the reserves
individuals would have to maintain if uninsured, because of insurer loading
costs."4 This is why society-wide calamities, such as nuclear war, are unin-
surable and, thus, are excluded in all policies. Where losses are highly corre-
lated, they cannot be effectively reduced by spreading them among those
subject to the risk. As we shall see, many limitations on liability insurance
coverage reflect this problem.
By reducing the risk level, effective risk aggregation reduces the pre-
mium necessary to insure a given risk. This can mean that fuller insurance
coverage (larger insurance benefits) can be offered for the same dollar pre-
mium. Or it can mean that insurance can be made more broadly available for
risks that would otherwise be uninsured. To the contrary, loss spreading, be-
cause it does not change the risk level, does not directly achieve either of
these benefits.
The method of aggregation chosen by the insurer can affect the extent
to which aggregation will reduce the risk level. The second basic insurance
function-risk segregation-is a method of improving the gains from basic
aggregation to reduce the risk level even further.
22 See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces
Moral Hazard, II1 MICH. L. REV. 197, 203 (2012); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rediscovering the Sawyer Solu-
tion: Bundling Riskfor Protection and Profit, I I RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 170, 174 (2013).
23 See Priest, Government Insurance, supra note 15, at 73.
24 See Marshall, supra note 21, at 477, 482.
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B. The Segregation of Risks
Risk segregation refers to insurer efforts to distinguish relatively high-
risk from low-risk policyholders and then to assign them to narrowly defined
risk pools. In the insurance industry, risk pool definition is referred to as in-
surance underwriting, although the principle affects the structure of the in-
dustry in other ways. Risk segregation reduces the risk level in two separate
dimensions. First, segregation can reduce statistical variance below that of a
more broadly aggregated pool. Second, segregation can influence the level
of the risky activity itself by setting the insurance premium to more closely
reflect the risk the activity adds to the pool. Here, again, insurance is much
different from savings and represents more than simple redistributional risk
spreading.
Most basically, "[s]egregating high- from low-risk policyholders can re-
duce risk variance and, thus, reduce the expected costs of insured injuries."25
The statistical basis for the effect is straightforward. Imagine two populations
of policyholders, one characterized by high risk, the other by low risk, for
which the risks within and across each population are independent. Risk pool
variance is calculated by summing the squares of the differences between
each pool element and the pool mean.26 If the two populations are aggregated
into a single pool, pool variance equals the sum of the squared differences
between each high-risk and low-risk element and the mean of the combined
pool. If, in contrast, the two populations are segregated into separate pools,
the variance of each pool equals the sum of the squared differences between
each element and the respective means of each segregated pool. It is straight-
forward that, to the extent of the difference between the means of the two
pools, the summed variance of the two segregated pools will be less than the
variance of the single undifferentiated pool.7 Because segregation reduces
variance, it reduces the risk level and reduces aggregate insurance premiums.
Segregating risks by risk level reduces risk variance in a manner very
similar to reducing risks by aggregation. As described above, by aggregating
independent risks into risk pools, the insurer increases predictive accuracy
by exploiting the law of large numbers. Increasing predictive accuracy re-
duces the risk level of the pool, even if it does not affect in any way the
frequency of losses that actually occur. Segregating risks into separate pools
according to risk levels serves a complementary function. Like aggregation,
segregation according to risk level improves an insurer's ability to predict
expected loss, making possible greater predictive accuracy. Again, this is
25 George L. Priest, The Government, he Market, and the Problem of Catastrophic Loss, 12 J. RISK
& UNCERTAINTY 219, 222 (1996) [hereafter Priest, Government, Market, & Catastrophic Loss]; see also
Priest, Government Insurance, supra note 15, at 74.
26 See Priest, Government, Market, & Catastrophic Loss, supra note 25, at 222.
27 See THOMAS H. WONNACOTFl & RONALD J. WONNACOTT, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS FOR
BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 213-19 (4th ed. 1990).
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what is meant by reducing risk variance. Thus, relative to broader and undif-
ferentiated risk pools, segregation reduces both pool riskiness and total in-
surance costs.
28
It is commonly believed that there is a tension between the advantages
of segregating policyholders into particularized risk categories and of spread-
ing losses broadly over the population. Many seem to think that the more
individualized the risk calculation, the lower the extent of loss spreading.
29
This view, too, however, derives from the confusion between the loss-spread-
ing and risk-reducing functions of insurance. To the extent that risks are un-
correlated and probabilistic in nature, their segregation into narrowly drawn
risk pools can reduce them. Policyholders can gain from such transactions,
up to the costs of segregation, because segregation lowers the effective risk
to each pool member. The premium charged to each member of the pool will
be lower than the cost of self-insurance, because self-insurance would nec-
essarily require taking into account a greater range of possible outcomes.
Of course, high-risk policyholders pay lower premiums with less than
with more differentiated risk pools because their risks are averaged into those
of a less risky population. If more precise differentiation is economically fea-
sible, however, the lower premium to the high-risk from the less-differenti-
ated pool is a subsidy, not a return from insurance aggregation. The subsidy
to the high-risk pool will reduce insurance availability by increasing premi-
ums to the low-risk pool. Increasing predictive accuracy by segregation re-
duces risk maximally. Even if there are justifications for subsidizing the high-
risk (which is doubtful), reducing these risks maximally reduces the extent
of the necessary subsidy and increases insurance availability.
In essence, the unwitting emphasis on risk spreading leads to the advo-
cacy of general social insurance, the broadest possible form of loss spread-
ing.3" As the earlier example demonstrated, however, lumping a wide set of
undifferentiated societal risks into a single social insurance risk pool will
surely increase rather than reduce the risk level faced by the society, another
advantage of the broad private insurance market in the U.S. and other coun-
tries.3
The second risk-reducing function of segregation is to set an insurance
premium that most accurately reflects the risk that a policyholder brings to
28 See Keith J. Crocker & Arthur Snow, The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrimination in the
Insurance Industry, 94 J. POL. ECON. 321, 328 (1986).
29 See generally, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 48-49 (1970); Fleming James, Jr., Accident Liability Reconsidered. The Impact of Liability
Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549, 556 (1948).
30 Kenneth Arrow, among other achievements, regards this point as important to his career. See
KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF RISK BEARING 135-38 (1971). See also CALABRESI,
supra note 29, at 46-47; James, supra note 29, at 550 n.l. Because Judge Calabresi includes o many
other values besides loss spreading in his analysis, his support of social insurance is far more constrained
than that of Professor James. See CALABRESI, supra note 29, at 64-67 (arguing that total loss spreading
through social insurance would not create collectively adequate incentives to reduce the accident rate).
31 See Priest, Government Insurance, supra note 15, at 73-77.
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the pool. Here, relative to undifferentiated insurance pools, precise risk seg-
regation can reduce the level of underlying injuries actually suffered. Charg-
ing policyholders a premium related to underlying risk informs the decisions
of potential policyholders as to whether and how much to engage in the ac-
tivity generating the risk. Oftentimes the concept of internalizing costs is in-
voked with this meaning. For example, the higher auto premiums charged
16- to 25-year-old males (or their parents) because of higher expected claims
costs serves as a market-rationing device for teenage male driving. Some
young males are prevented from driving or are encouraged to drive more
carefully because of the higher premiums charged or the fear of subsequent
higher premiums if they become involved in an accident or commit a traffic
violation.32 As a result, relative to a regime without risk segregation, the ac-
cident rate will be lower.33 All forms of insurance premium discrimination
have this effect.
Just as risk segregation charges appropriately higher premiums to the
high risk, it charges appropriately lower premiums to the low risk. Here, pre-
cise risk pool definition extends insurance availability by controlling adverse
selection. Adverse selection is a problem central to every insurance context-
An insurer must collect into a risk pool individuals with a sufficiently narrow
range of exposure to risk for the insurance to remain financially attractive to
each member of the pool. Since insurance premiums must be set according
to the average level of risk brought to the pool, the wider the range between
high-risk and low-risk pool members, the greater the difference between the
premium set equal to the average risk and the risk of the low-risk members.
If the disparity between the premium and the risks added by low-risk mem-
bers becomes too substantial, low-risk members will drop out of the pool
because they find alternative means of protection cheaper than market insur-
ance.34 At the extreme, as low-risk members drop out, the insurance pool will
unravel.35 One of the most important reasons that some risks are uninsurable
is that insurers are unable to narrow the assortment of risks within a risk pool.
Those insurers who are better at identification and segregation can offer
32 I have family experience to this effect.
33 Many studies demonstrate this result. For a demonstration of a dramatic increase in the accident
rate following the prohibition of insurance discrimination in Quebec by age, sex, violation record, and
accident experience, see e.g., Rose Anne Devlin, Liability Versus No-Fault Automobile Insurance Re-
gimes: An Analysis of the Experience in Quebec, in CONTRIBUTIONS TO INSURANCE ECONOMICS 499 (G.
Dionne ed., 1992).
34 For an empirical demonstration of adverse selection following the adoption of non-discriminating
no-fault auto insurance in Quebec, see id. at 501-14.
35 George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons ": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,
84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 492-94 (1970) (discussing this phenomenon in the context of medical insurance). For
examples of the unraveling effect in commercial liability insurance, see George L. Priest, The Current
Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1556-59 (1987) [hereafter Priest, Insurance
Crisis].
2017]
GEO. MASON L. REv.
lower premiums to low-risk policyholders and can thus expand insurance
availability.
The importance of these points about the aggregation and segregation
of risks to lower insurance premiums is implicated in the serious problems
insurers face with adverse selection. Another aspect of adverse selection is
the phenomenon of asymmetric information as between a potential policy-
holder and the insurer.3 6 Where a potential policyholder knows that it is likely
to suffer a loss or knows that it is differentially susceptible to suffering a loss,
there is an information asymmetry from the insurer who may, lacking that
information, place the policyholder into an incorrect risk pool. If the policy-
holder has misrepresented its risk profile in some way on its insurance appli-
cation or in discussions with an agent, these informational asymmetries may
substantially affect the insurer's underwriting.
As a consequence, it is well established that the more precisely insurers
can accurately segregate risks by insurance discrimination, the more broadly
insurance can be offered in the society.37 A court that wanted to maximize
insurance availability in the society would adopt policies that encouraged
maximally effective discrimination in order to segregate risks into the nar-
rowest possible pools. Unfortunately, much of the modem judicial treatment
of insurance issues, much of modem insurance regulation, and many of the
rule changes proposed in the new Restatement and the Restatement Discus-
sion Draft have been influenced by conceptions of loss spreading, rather than
risk reduction, and have diminished (or will if approved diminish) insurance
availability by thwarting risk segregation through insurance discrimination.38
The difference between the view of insurance as loss spreading and in-
surance as risk reduction becomes quite sharp at this point. Loss spreading is
often defended solely on distributional grounds. Spreading shifts the costs of
bearing losses away from parties that generate losses to parties viewed as
better able to bear them. For example, assigned risk pools in auto insurance
or residual market carriers in medical malpractice insurance shift the costs
generated by more risky drivers or doctors to the less risky.39 Loss shifting of
this nature can only be achieved by compulsion and can only be defended on
grounds of distributional preference."n But the implications of such loss shift-
ing are often neglected. By defeating the risk-reduction benefits of segrega-
tion, this form of loss shifting increases the risk level, increases the underly-
ing injury level, and reduces insurance availability. The gains to the subsi-
dized high-risk policyholders are paid for in increased risk, increased injury,
36 Kenneth Abraham emphasizes this point. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and
the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 942, 946-47 (1988).
37 See Crocker & Snow, supra note 28, at 322-30; Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilib-
rium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J.
ECON. 629, 634-37 (1976).
38 For examples, see Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 34, at 1535-36, 1538-39.
39 See CALABRESI, supra note 29, at 52-54, for many other examples.
40 Judge Calabresi openly admits this point. Id. at 281-83.
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and less available insurance, losses ignored in the emphasis on simple wealth
distribution. One should not confuse some distributional desirability of aid-
ing certain high-isk classes with the means chosen to aid them. Whatever a
society's distributional ends, there is less need for compulsory distribution
where insurance reduces risks as much as possible.
The aggregation and segregation functions of insurance, then, are simi-
lar both in method and effect. Both serve to increase predictive accuracy in
order to reduce the risk level and the effective costs of injuries. Reducing
injury costs, however, necessarily generates offsetting effects. Where ex-
pected injury costs are lower, the underlying level of activity and the under-
lying injury rate will increase. This is known in economics as moral hazard.4
All insurance regimes generate this effect. The third function of insurance
design is to mitigate this moral hazard in order to maximize the gains from
insurance.
C. Controlling Moral Hazard Through Deductibles, Coinsurance, and
Exclusions of Coverage
Moral hazard is a second chief problem in the administration of insur-
ance. Ex ante moral hazard is the reduction in precautions taken by a policy-
holder to prevent the loss because of the existence of insurance.42 Ex post
moral hazard is the increase in claims against the insurance beyond the ser-
vices the claimant would have purchased if not insured.43 Moral hazard in-
creases the costs of injuries and, thus, increases the risk level. Ex ante moral
hazard increases the frequency of loss; ex post moral hazard increases the
costs of losses that have actually occurred. Insurance regimes can reduce risk
by controlling both ex ante and ex post moral hazard. Insurers will attempt
to control both forms of moral hazard by the definition of insurance coverage
and by the design of insurance benefits.
Insurers will constrain or, at the limit, exclude coverage of losses par-
ticularly susceptible to policyholder moral hazard. The omnipresent exclu-
sion in life insurance policies of coverage for death by suicide is an obvious
example. The exclusion serves to control moral hazard by removing the in-
centive that providing large monetary amounts to beneficiaries would add to
other forces compelling the act.' Less dramatically, the exclusion in con-
41 The costs of the increase in injuries because of insurance will be less than the reduction in effec-
tive costs achieved by insurance; otherwise there will be no demand for insurance.
42 Priest, Insurance Crisis, upra note 35, at 1547.
43 id.
44 Today, life insurance policies typically exclude coverage for death by suicide only for the first
two policy years. It is not clear that the two-year limitation on the exclusion derives from insurer judgment
that two years is a sufficient margin to control moral hazard. More probably, the limitation derives from
direct regulatory pressure or indirect judicial pressure from the desire to allow coverage whenever possible
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sumer product warranties of coverage of easily broken glass parts or the eas-
ily marred product finish, or the exclusion in auto warranties of coverage of
engine damage from racing or towing heavy loads, serves a similar function.4"
These exclusions place the burden of these particular losses on the policy-
holders themselves, increasing policyholder preventive efforts and, at the
same time, culling out (segregating) high-risk policyholders relatively more
susceptible to such losses.46
Exclusions serve to segregate risk pools in a different way. For example,
most commercial general liability policies exclude coverage of liabilities de-
riving from property owned by the policyholder. This does not mean that
property-related liabilities cannot be insured; rather, these liabilities can be
insured more precisely in a separate property insurance market. Similarly,
the introduction of the pollution exclusion in commercial general liability
policies in the 1980s forced policyholders expecting the possibility of pollu-
tion liability to purchase separate pollution coverage, lowering the premiums
of commercial general liability coverage to those policyholders not expecting
such liabilities.
47
Insurers also control moral hazard by the definition of insurance bene-
fits, in particular, the introduction of deductibles and coinsurance. Deducti-
bles and coinsurance shift part of a loss suffered by a policyholder back to
the policyholder itself. Only less completely than coverage exclusions, de-
ductibles and coinsurance reduce indifference to preventive investments, and
they reduce the incentives to consume what, from an ex ante view, are exces-
sive levels of insurance services.
Although deductibles and coinsurance reduce insurance benefits, they
are generally essential to the maximization of insurance benefits net of insur-
ance costs. Deductibles and coinsurance, obviously, reduce insurance cover-
age by some proportion. The proportionate reduction in coverage is attractive
to the dominant set of insurance purchasers because with full coverage, the
insurance premium would be much higher. More precisely, the existence of
moral hazard means that, in comparing full coverage to reduced coverage
and the consequent refusal to enforce exclusions deemed unreasonable because not fully understood by
judges or regulators. It is an interesting question to compare the suicide rate among life insurance policy-
holders without the two-year limitation, but it is implausible that he surely dominant majority of policy-
holders not contemplating suicide would voluntarily wish to purchase coverage for death by suicide after
the second policy year to protect for that contingency.
45 See Priest, Consumer Product Warranty, supra note 13, at 1317-18, for many other examples.
46 Direct risk monitoring by insurers (such as requiring the installation of specific safety devices
and inspecting for compliance) is very similar to the control of moral hazard by exclusions.
47 See Sharon M. Murphy, The "Sudden and Accidental" Exception to the Pollution Exclusion
Clause in Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policies: The Gordian Knot of Environmental Li-
ability, 45 VAND. L. REv. 161, 167, 170-71 (1991).
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with deductibles and coinsurance, the proportionate increase in premium ne-
cessitated by full coverage is greater than the proportionate increase in insur-
ance benefits to the dominant set of policyholders.4"
There is a broader implication of the dramatic extent to which deducti-
bles, coinsurance, and coverage exclusions allow reductions in insurance pre-
miums. Reductions in coverage of this nature ultimately increase the extent
to which citizens can obtain insurance coverage. The cost savings achieved
by the introduction of exclusions, deductibles, and coinsurance necessarily
will make insurance available to individuals who may not otherwise be able
to pay the costs of full insurance. Societies like ours in which the level of
income is not so uniform that all citizens are able to purchase private insur-
ance must be attentive to methods of making insurance more affordable. Any
technique-such as the introduction of a $50 deductible-that reduces insur-
ance premiums by a large number may well have a significant impact on the
ability of low-income citizens to obtain private insurance coverage.
49
The beneficial effects of deductibles, coinsurance, and coverage exclu-
sions as methods of controlling moral hazard have been largely neglected.
Because these insurance provisions directly allocate losses to the policy-
holder, their existence might seem antithetical to broad loss spreading) But
here again the limitations of the loss-spreading metaphor become clear. De-
ductibles and coinsurance admittedly place some proportion of loss on the
policyholder; a coverage exclusion places all of the loss on the policyholder.
48 An example, though dated (it is very rare to obtain statistics of this nature), suggests the insurance
benefit calculus. Some years ago, the famous New Zealand Accident Compensation Scheme, which pro-
vides national insurance for a specific set of accidents, faced severe financial constraints, approaching
bankruptcy. A study group, appointed to rescue the system, analyzed the effects of introducing deductibles
and coinsurance in place of the full coverage offered before. The group discovered that the introduction
of modest deductibles would have massive effects on total compensation system costs. For example, for
1987, total estimated expenditures on a category of costs relating to medical, hospital and dental treatment
were $120.9 million, given no deductible. The group estimated that the introduction of a $250 deductible
would reduce these costs by $80 million, over 66 percent. Similarly, total estimated 1987 expenditures on
general practitioner treatment were $50.9 million. The group estimated that the introduction of a $50
patient deductible would reduce these costs by $30 million. These figures are surely underestimates, since
they are calculated simply by subtracting aggregate past claims expenses for amounts less than the pro-
posed deductibles. Thus, they do not adjust for the decline in consumer demand for these services that
would likely result from the increase in their effective price. J.T. CHAPMAN, ET AL., I REVIEW BY
OFFICIALS COMMITTEE OF THE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION SCHEME [sic] 42-43 (1986).
The New Zealand examples illustrate how insurers in competitive insurance markets define levels of in-
surance coverage. Of course, policyholders who expect frequent or extensive claims against the insurance
are likely to prefer full coverage without deductibles or coinsurance, perhaps even at the higher premium
necessitated by that level of coverage. But if there exists a set of policyholders who want basic insurance
coverage, but do not expect frequent or extensive claims, then the insurer may optimize insurance sales
by tailoring coverage to better meet its needs through incorporating deductibles, coinsurance, and specific
coverage exclusions. If insurance coverage in New Zealand were defined by private firms in a competitive
market, for example, one might discover that insurance sales were optimized by offering general practi-
tioner coverage with a $50 deductible at a premium reduced by 60 percent.
49 See e.g., id at 43.
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To this end, these provisions conflict with simple loss spreading. But as such
provisions lower total insurance costs, they allow the extension of basic in-
surance benefits more broadly to the society. Thus, for example, the exclu-
sion of life insurance coverage to suicides allows the premium for basic life
insurance to be lower, and makes it possible for some individuals who would
not or could not purchase life insurance at a higher premium to obtain basic
life insurance protection. Similarly, the exclusion of coverage of engine dam-
age from racing in the standard auto warranty keeps the costs associated with
this high-risk activity from being averaged into the warranty cost component
of the average auto purchaser. Thus, though seemingly paradoxical, reducing
insurance benefits through deductibles, coinsurance, and coverage exclu-
sions can maximize the available insurance coverage to the society.
D. Insurance as Contract"
Contracts generally provide for the distribution of duties and responsi-
bilities between the parties to the contract. This distribution is based upon the
relative comparative advantages of each party in contributing towards the
objective of the contract.
Insurance contracts are no different. In their multiple provisions, they
assign duties to policyholders: principally, through deductibles, exclusions,
and other limitations of coverage, to prevent losses themselves where it is
economical to do so. They exclude coverage of risks that cannot be effec-
tively insured (such as the nuclear liability exclusion). They also assign du-
ties to insurers: to provide a defined level of coverage for losses that are in-
surable.
In most cases-putting aside complicated commercial manuscript poli-
cies-insurance contracts are standardized, as are most contracts in our com-
plex society. It has become typical in the insurance literature to describe in-
surance contracts, because drafted by insurers (in fact, the drafting process is
more complicated) as one-sided and as contracts of adhesion. It is argued that
insurance contracts are seldom read by policyholders and, on these grounds,
their provisions ought to be preempted. This is certainly the approach of the
drafters of the proposed Restatement and the Restatement Discussion Draft,
as I shall show in the next Part.5"
But this approach neglects modem reality. In an age of mass production,
consumers enter contracts of the nature of insurance contracts daily, from the
purchase of cell phone programs, to the licensing of computer programs, to
50 I use this term in a somewhat different way than in Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of
Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 658 (2013), because I acknowledge an important regulatory role. The
concept is also different from the view of the Reporters who deny the importance of mutual agreement,
see Discussion Draft, supra note 6, § 2, cmt. h, at 15, and also maintain (without explanation) that insur-
ance contracts should be treated differently than other contracts. Id.
" See Part II, infra.
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FedEx or UPS or Postal Service mailings, to the purchase of other consumer
products whose contractual warranties are only discovered after the product
is delivered, discovered later if the product proves defective. In the U.S., the
same is true with respect to contracts with service providers such as public
utilities.
The drafters of the proposed Restatement make much of their assertion
that consumers do not read the terms of their insurance contracts before en-
tering into them, and, as I shall explain, use this point to advocate for broader
policyholder privileges, against the terms of basic insurance policies.
The claim, first, is surely not true and should not be the basis of new
rules regarding insurance. Consumers read basic insurance terms: limits of
coverage; deductibles; and special provisions related to their personal insur-
ance situation (protection for valuable collections, jewelry, and the like).
Second, in a context of a highly regulated industry, where regulatory
officials read and regulate all of the provisions of a policy before authorizing
it, the consumer can confidently delegate the details of non-central terms to
a regulator, focusing itself on the basic terms.2 Moreover, in the U.S., com-
mercial and personal lines of insurance are highly competitive.53 There is no
general reason to believe that insurance contracts exploit policyholders;, in-
deed, the omnipresent advertisements among competing insurers dictate the
opposite. Policy terms in most insurance contracts are designed to benefit
policyholders in terms of coverage versus premium. Insurance policies, in
these respects, are far more likely to have been consented to than many other
consumer contracts in our society.
As the next Part illustrates, however, the proposed revisions of the new
Restatement of Liability Insurance and the Restatement Discussion Draft de-
part from these economic principles in substantial ways. As will be ex-
plained, these proposals seem to derive from the view that insurance is
chiefly redistributional-spreading risks-and seek to shift that distribution
substantially more toward policyholders, upsetting the allocation of respon-
sibilities found optimal in the current insurance market.
II. THE NEW RULES OF THE RESTATEMENT DISCUSSION DRAFT
CONSIDERED
This Part addresses the Restatement Discussion Draft both in concep-
tion and with respect to the specific rules that it aspires to discuss. It should
be noted at the outset, before addressing the specific rule proposals, that, in
my view, the Reporters of the proposed Restatement, initially contracted to
draft an aspirational "Principles" project, later transmuted into a proposed
52 See AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, PROPERTY-CASUALTY INSURANCE BASICS 3,
http://www.aiadc.org/File / 2Library/Resources/Industry/o2OResources/nsurance%201 01/Ins_ 101 .pdf.
53 Id. at7.
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Restatement, and then into the Restatement Draft Discussion, view them-
selves as visionaries and not bound by the common law method or its princi-
ples which has been the backbone of the ALI's Restatement projects over the
many past decades.
For example, as mentioned, they introduce new categorizations of rules
as either "mandatory" rules-which cannot be changed by contractual agree-
ment54-or as "default" rules, controlling unless explicitly changed by con-
tract.5 Although a few courts have used these terms, they are not endemic to
the common law.56 This distinction has become a fashion in the academic
world, elaborating a categorization of legal rules initiated many years ago by
a dear colleague of mine.57 But they are rules befitting of a state-ordered cod-
ification, not of the workout of legal decisions in multiple cases decided by
separate courts over many years.
This point, however, is merely a prelude to the discussion of the Report-
ers' normative aims in the Principles project, in the proposed Restatement,
and, again, in the Restatement Discussion Draft: to push the law toward more
policyholder-friendly rules, regardless of the insurance contract that the par-
ties entered. Section A identifies this normative objective. Sections B, C, and
D address the Reporters' substantive proposals dealing with misrepresenta-
tion on the part of policyholder; the insurer's duties with respect to defense;
and, separately, settlement. As shall be explained, in each of these areas, the
Reporters' proposals will have the economic effect of reducing insurance
availability in the society.
A. Initial Considerations: The Approach of the Reporters
It was evident in the Principles project, but is also evident in the pro-
posed Restatement, and in the Restatement Discussion Draft, that the Report-
ers are aspiring to move the law so that it puts policyholders in a better posi-
tion than they are in the insurance contracts that they currently enter. Again,
this is a normative ambition of the Reporters and ignores the market circum-
stances that lead policyholders and insurers to enter the insurance contracts
that they do.
54 Restatement PD No. 1, supra note 4, § 1(9) (manuscript at 2); Discussion Draft, supra note 6,
§ 1(7) (manuscript at 2); Id. at cmt. e (manuscript at 7-8).
55 Restatement PD No. 1, supra note 4, § 1 (10) (manuscript at 2); Discussion Draft, supra note 6,
§ 1(8) (manuscript at 2); Id. at cmt. e (manuscript at 7-8).
56 The Reporters admit this point. See Discussion Draft, supra note 6, § 1, cmt. c (manuscript at 6).
57 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1096-97 (1972). For the modem extrapolation, see
the work of another dear colleague, Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91-92 (1989).
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The examples in the proposed Restatement and Discussion Draft are re-
plete and appear to derive from the conclusion that policyholders are unable
to grasp the complexities of insurance:58
[C]urrent practices in the consumer insurance market make it unlikely that a consumer will
receive a complete copy of a liability insurance policy before purchase. [No empirical evidence
provided.]. It is not assumed or expected that consumers ordinarily read their insurance poli-
cies, nor that legal rules can do very much to change consumer behavior in this regard.
59
[A] court should take into account the sophistication of the insured and the practical reality
that ordinary people do not read, and cannot reasonably be expected to read, their insurance
policies.
60
These are examples; the approach suffuses the proposed Restatement
and Discussion Draft and appears to motivate the specific rule proposals that
I next address.
In succeeding Parts, I discuss the proposed drafts of the Restatement
Discussion Draft addressing rules regarding policyholder misrepresentation,
and insurers' obligations to defend and, separately, to settle claims: the con-
tents of the currently completed sections of the proposed Restatement and the
Discussion Draft. The question with respect to each of these issues i whether
these proposed rules are in the long-term interest of policyholders with re-
spect to maximizing the availability of insurance to the society.
B. Misrepresentation
The term "misrepresentation" refers to a potential policyholder's at-
tempt to obtain insurance by failing to disclose in an insurance application or
a renewal application facts that would either lead an insurer to deny coverage
altogether or allow the insurer to put the applicant into a less favorable risk
pool.
6'
According to current law, a misrepresentation of a material fact by an
applicant for insurance voids the insurance contract.62 This is also the law
58 More sharply in the proposed Restatement than in the Discussion Draft, the Reporters sought to
distinguish large commercial policyholders from individual or small commercial policyholders. Although
no longer a black letter proposal, there remain many references to this distinction in the Discussion Draft.
See e.g., Discussion Draft, supra note 6, § 21 cmt. a (manuscript at 154-56); Id. at § 7 cmt. f (manuscript
at at 76-77).
59 Restatement PD No. 1, supra note 4, § 2 cmt. c (manuscript at 11); Discussion Draft, supra note
6, § 2 cmt. d (manuscript at 13-14).
60 Restatement PD No. 1, supra note 4, § 6 cmt. c (manuscript at 49); Discussion Draft, supra note
6, § 6 cmt. c (manuscript at 65).
61 Restatement PD No. 1, supra note 4, § 7 (manuscript at 56).
62 Kevin Gatzlaff, et al., Material Misrepresentations in Insurance Litigation: An Analysis of In-
sureds'Arguments and Court Decisions, 34 J. INS. REG. 1, 2 (2015).
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regarding other areas of contracts. There are good economic reasons support-
ing these rules. Parties to contracts need to know the risks they are facing in
order to create a contract that maximizes mutual value to them.
With respect to insurance, a potential insurer will want to know whether
a teenage son in the applicant's family with access to the car has had zero,
three, or six accidents or infractions during the past year or what the driving
experience of the family (put aside the son) has been. Similarly, a potential
homeowner insurer will want to know what the claims history of the family
has been with respect to home losses. A potential life insurer will want to
know if the applicant smokes or has a family history of cancer or heart dis-
ease.63 These facts are essential for placing potential policyholders into ap-
propriate risk pools. They are also cost effective in terms of maximizing the
possibilities of insurance. The potential policyholder is in the best position to
know its experiences and the facts of the losses it has suffered in the past.
The misrepresentation rules proposed by the Reporters substantially
constrain this effort. In the Restatement, the Reporters proposed limiting the
insurer misrepresentation defense to only misrepresentations that were inten-
tionally or recklessly committed.64 This proposal would have eliminated for
an insurer the defense of misrepresentation where the policyholder can claim
that it was "merely" negligent.65 This would be a significant change in the
law and entirely opposite to the aim of reducing costs to increase insurance
availability.
As discussed earlier, the ambition of an insurance contract, as of all
other contracts, is to maximize the joint product of the two parties entering
the contract. In this light, is there any value in shielding one party to the con-
tract from revealing the risks it poses to the agreement? Misrepresentation
defeats the important objective of insurer segregation of risks to increase in-
surance availability.
In the Discussion Draft, the Reporters have changed this rule to also
allow an insurer defense to negligent policyholder misrepresentations.66 The
Discussion Draft, however, continues to contain many passages suggesting
that the insurer defense should only extend to misrepresentations that re in-
tentional or reckless.67
The Reporters, even in the Discussion Draft, defend the restriction of
the defense to intentional or reckless misrepresentations by arguing that since
prospective policyholders are buying insurance to protect themselves from
63 Life insurance is not controlled by this proposed Restatement or Discussion Draft, though the
obvious differences in rules relating to these two common insurance areas bring the Reporters' proposals
into question.
64 Restatement PD No. 1, supra note 4, § 7(2)(a) (manuscript at 66).
65 Id. at § 7, cmt. c (manuscript at 57-58).
66 Discussion Draft, supra note 6, § 7(2) (manuscript at 73).
67 E.g., id. at § 7(2)(a) (manuscript at 73); Id. at § 7 cmt. a (manuscript at 74); Id. at § 7 cmt. g
(manuscript at 77); Id. at § 7, Reporters' Notes cmt. c (manuscript at 84); Id. § 9, cmt. b (manuscript at
113).
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negligent behavior in other contexts-auto driving, home ownership-why
not expand insurer liabilities to protect these applicants from negligence in
the application process?68 But this is sophistical, not persuasive. It is a differ-
ent matter entirely when an insured drifts into a different lane or mistakes the
brake for the gas pedal in parking or neglects to trim trees (leading to a branch
fall that causes loss) than where an insurance applicant "mistakes" the son's
driving record or the number of claims filed against previous insurers on an
application sitting right before him. Ask the IRS whether insurance is avail-
able for negligence in our tax returns.
The Reporters further seek to shift insurance responsibility by placing a
burden on insurers to investigate the past history of the applicant, rather than
relying on the applicant's representations in an insurance or renewal applica-
tion.69 The ignorance of cost effectiveness is evident in this proposal. How
does it add value to a possible insurance contract for an insurer to spend
money in investigation, rather than requiring the applicant to fully tell the
truth?
The Reporters further add with respect to these proposals, though not
unpredictably, that any misrepresentation defense, to void the insurance con-
tract, must be material7" and lead to substantial detrimental reliance by'the
insurer." They propose very strong standards for an insurer to prove materi-
ality and detrimental reliance. These provisions simply add to the shift in
responsibility from the insurance applicant to the insurer in determining the
risk attributes of the applicant. Even as amended, these rules, if adopted, will
have the economic effect of reducing insurance availability to the society by
increasing the costs and reducing the predictability of the underwriting pro-
cess.
C. The Insurer's Defense of Claims
Many policies-most personal policies, some commercial policies-
provide for the insurer to possess the right and duty to defend claims against
the policyholder or against those insured under the policy. In some situations,
there are issues as to whether the claims fall within the coverage agreement
of the policy, since all risks cannot be insured and since policyholders do not
always acquire insurance to cover all of the risks that they face. In those sit-
uations, the insurer may provide the defense, but reserve rights to contest
coverage later, as further facts develop. In other situations, an insurer may
simply decline to provide the defense, essentially denying coverage of the
claim and leaving the policyholder or insured to defend the claim on its own.
68 Id. at § 7, cmt. j (manuscript at 78-79).
69 Id. at § 7 cmt. b (manuscript at 75); Id. at § 9, cmt. d (manuscript at 115).
70 Id. at § 8 (manuscript at 98).
71 Id. at § 9 (manuscript at 111).
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The coverage issue of course remains litigable, and policyholders can some-
times demonstrate that coverage and defense should have been provided
where the insurer denied them. If successful, this constitutes an insurer's
breach of the duty to defend.
The Reporters propose extremely punitive rules to govern these cases.
Section 19(1) of the Discussion Draft provides that "[a]n insurer that
breaches the duty to defend a claim loses the right to assert any control over
the defense or settlement of the claim and the right to contest coverage for
the claim. 72 It is not evident as to how many claims some parts of this rule
will apply. If the insurer is found to have breached the duty to defend, pre-
sumably it has denied its right of defense or association and, consequently,
its control over settlement of the claim, though perhaps there are exceptions.73
The most important part of the Reporters' approach, however (includ-
ing supplemental rules which shall be discussed), is the proposal that, if the
insurer has breached the duty to defend, it loses its right to contest coverage
of the claim.74 The Reporters concede that this is not the majority rule in the
states, but claim it is a "better rule":
About half of the states have held that an insurer that breaches the duty to defend does not
automatically forfeit its coverage defenses, but a respectable minority has held that it does.
The better rule is the minority rule adopted here.
75
This is a radical rule and violates the principle of increasing insurance
availability.76 The Reporters do not conceal that the rule is meant to be puni-
tive. The rule is not founded in principle. There may be losses to a policy-
holder from an insurer's breach to defend a claim, especially litigation costs
that an insurer cannot control if it has denied coverage. If there is a breach,
as in other contractual contexts, those losses should be recompensed.
But why should the insurer forfeit a coverage defense? Many claims
against policyholders involve losses that may be covered by insurance and
losses that are not. Does the breach of the duty to defend make the non-in-
surable (or non-insured) losses insurable? All agree, for example, that the
losses from a nuclear attack on the country are non-insurable; that is why all
insurance policies include a nuclear loss exclusion. What is the point of lim-
ited redistribution after losses of these dimensions? But if a policyholder
showed that, just before such an attack, the insurer had breached its duty to
72 Discussion Draft, supra note 6, at § 19(2) (manuscript at 153-54). According to the Reporters,
this is the minority view among courts. Id. at § 19 cmt. a (manuscript at 154). See infra notes 75-80 and
accompanying text.
73 An exception might be if the insurer recants on the denial of defense, though this is not explained
in the Restatement or the Discussion Draft.
74 Discussion Draft, supra note 6, at § 19(1) (manuscript at 153-54).
75 Id. at § 19 cmt. a (manuscript at 154).
76 The Reporters concede this point: "the forfeiture-of-coverage-defense rule may increase the cost
of liability insurance." ld. at § 21, cmt. a (manuscript at 156).
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defend, should it recover from insurers for those losses? Or, more realisti-
cally, imagine that a policy includes a standard pollution exclusion, relegat-
ing the policyholder, as explained above, to acquire separate pollution cov-
erage. Should the standard policy that excludes pollution coverage have the
coverage exclusion banned and the pollution losses added to the non-pollu-
tion pool because of the insurer's breach? What happens if the policyholder
possessed separate pollution coverage? The proposed Restatement and Dis-
cussion Draft do not explain.
The Reporters propose additional subsidiary rules that are equally puni-
tive and will equally have the effect of reducing insurance availability. For
example, the Reporters propose that, when an insurer defends a full claim
against a policyholder and issues a reservation of rights, but it is later deter-
mined that some aspects of losses claimed were not covered under the pol-
icy,77 the insurer may not recoup any portion of defense costs related to the
defense of uninsured loss.78
This proposal raises a similar problem. Why should the insurer and con-
sumers placed in the underlying insurance pool be saddled with the costs of
defending claims not within the offered insurance? The Reporters
acknowledge that this proposal conflicts with other longstanding rules stated
in other ALI Restatements, in particular the Restatement of Restitution,
which, admirably, and for good economic reasons, assigns costs to those that
generate them.79 They invoke "special considerations of insurance law" to
justify their position, considerations asserted, but not explained, in the cur-
rent proposed Restatement or in the Discussion Draft.s"
The Reporters also make a serious attack on "Other Insurance" clauses
in insurance policies. There are various versions of "Other Insurance" provi-
sions.8" Basically, they become important where a policyholder or insured
possesses multiple policies that may cover a particular loss. These clauses
are often confusing because an insurer in a position of providing coverage to
a policyholder, or insureds who have complicated insurance arrangements,82
is unlikely to know or be able to adequately contemplate what the other in-
surance commitments of the policyholder or insureds are. Courts in many
cases have worked out these complications.
The Reporters of the proposed Restatement and Discussion Draft do not
attempt or provide a solution for working them out and, essentially, reject the
common law approach to this issue. The Reporters propose to abrogate
77 When some portions of a multifaceted claim fall within the coverage of the policy, it is a general
rule that the insurer's duty to defend includes defense against all aspects of the claim.
78 Discussion Draft, supra note 6, § 21 (manuscript at 178).
79 See id. at § 21, cmt. b (manuscript at 67). As between the proposed Restatement and the Discus-
sion Draft, the Reporters hedge this point. See id. at § 21, cmt. b (manuscript at 67-68); cf Restatement
PD No. 1, supra note 4, at 153-54..
80 Discussion Draft, supra note 6, at § 21 cmt. b (manuscript at 68).
81 See Abraham, supra note 50, at 679-86.
82 These issues are not common in personal insurance lines.
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"Other Insurance" clauses and the common law relating to these clauses by
proposing a rule of joint and severable liability for all insurers involved in
multiple insurance situations.83 They describe, without analysis, Other Insur-
ance provisions as "mutually repugnant"84 and as "'escape' clauses."85
I accept the fact that Other Insurance clauses are not well understood
empirically and have been under-analyzed. But the proposals of the Report-
ers miss the point. No policyholder, prior to a loss, wishes to pay twice for
coverage of a prospective loss. Other Insurance clauses, among other provi-
sions of insurance policies, address this issue. The joint and several liability
proposals of the Reporters will require all insurers in a position of potential
multiple representation to take all possibilities of loss into account, increas-
ing insurance premiums and reducing the availability of insurance.
D. Insurers' Duties in the Context of Settlement
Most claims are settled prior to judgment.86 In the context of insurance,
the law requires the insurer, who possesses the right and duty to defend these
claims, to do so in the best interest of the policyholder, which means in the
best interest of both parties to the insurance contract.
Questions arise when an insurer has rejected a settlement demand by a
claimant against a policyholder within policy limits, but the resulting judg-
ment after trial exceeds policy limits.87 As a general matter, many courts have
found in these circumstances that insurers that had not engaged in "reasona-
ble" settlement discussions should be liable for the full amount of the judg-
ment, despite the limits of coverage of the insurers' policies."8
83 Discussion Draft, supra note 6, at § 20(4)(b) (manuscript at 167).
84 Id. at § 20, cmt. a (manuscript at 168).
85 Id. at § 20, Reporter's Note, cmt. a (manuscript at 174).
86 1 have studied this issue with regard to all claims, not simply insurer-defended claims, which
could not be separately identified. See George L. Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Congestion Prob-
lem, 69 B.U. L. REV. 527, 531 (1989).
87 Obviously, if the judgment is within policy limits, the insurer pays the full amount.
88 See, e.g., Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Am. Casualty Co., 390 So.2d 761, 764
(Fla. 1980) ("The courts have developed an action for bad faith in order to protect insured persons from
unnecessary excess judgments resulting from the willingness of insurance companies to risk trials rather
than negotiate and settle claims against insured individuals. The insurance company, usually in control of
settlement under policy provisions requiring it's consent, is obligated to comply with it concomitant duty
to exercise reasonable diligence and decide in good faith whether to settle a claim." (citing Auto Mut.
Indem. Co. v. Shaw, 184 So. 852 (Fla. 1938)); Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 323 A.2d
495, 507 (N.J. 1974) ("We ... hold that an insurer, having contractually restricted the independent nego-
tiating power of its insured, has a positive fiduciary duty to take the initiative and attempt to negotiate a
settlement within the policy coverage. Any doubt as to the existence of an opportunity to settle within the
face amount of the coverage or as to the ability and willingness of the insured to pay any excess required
for settlement must be resolved in favor of the insured unless the insurer, by some affirmative evidence,
demonstrates there was not only no realistic possibility of settlement within policy limits, but also that the
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These cases, however, raise the question as to what are "reasonable"
offers by insurers in settlement? If an insurer views the value of the claim as
$10,000, and the claimant demands $50,000, is the insurer's refusal to pay
the settlement demand "reasonable," negating the requirement of paying if
the judgment proves to be greater than policy limits?
The Reporters address this issue in several ways. First, they propose a
formalistic approach to determining settlement reasonableness. They propose
a mathematical formula, presumably to be filled in by expert witnesses (who
will chiefly be lawyers) to assess the relative probability of the success of the
claim. These experts' probability estimates will define a range of probable
success for the claim and whether the insurer's settlement behavior was rea-
sonable by falling within that range. If the insurer's settlement offer did not,
then the insurer is liable for the full judgment.8 9
One can question whether this evaluation should be delegated to expert
witnesses rather than given to a judge or jury. The Reporters correctly
acknowledge that there is likely to be a substantial hindsight bias in these
probability-of-success estimates since the eventual judgment proved greater
than the insurer anticipated prior to trial.9"
Though this proposal was dropped as between the Principles project, the
proposed Restatement, and the Discussion Draft, the Reporters extensively
discuss (as to keep the option open) that an insurer's reasonable settlement
offer should include the insurer's expected litigation costs, which obviously
would increase the amount of what a court might view as a "reasonable" offer
by an insurer and increase the chances that the insurer would be held in
breach of the obligation to settle.9'
The insurer's expected legal expenses, however, do not increase the
value that a claimant is willing to accept to settle a case based on the expected
value to the claimant of the verdict.92 To include these litigation costs in the
formula defining a "reasonable" settlement offer from an insurer would have
the effect of increasing the settlement range in favor of claimants, against
policyholders and insurers, reducing insurance availability. This proposal,
though still entertained by the Reporters, was appropriately deleted as be-
tween the Principles project, the Restatement and the Discussion Draft.
As with the Reporters' discussion of defense obligations, they propose
with regard to settlement that an insurer who settles a claim-not simply an
insurer who breaches the obligation to settle-should not be able to recoup
insured would not have contributed to whatever settlement figure above that sum might have been avail-
able.").
89 Discussion Draft, supra note 6, § 24, cmt. a, illus. I (manuscript at 93-94); Id at § 24, cmt. f,
illus. 2 (manuscript at 97-98); Id. at § 24, cmt. j, illus. 6 (manuscript at 103).
90 Id. at § 24, cmt i (manuscript at 100); Id. at § 24, Reporter's Note, cmt c (manuscript at 107).
91 Discussion Draft, supra note 6, § 14(a) (manuscript at 114).
92 I have studied this extensively. See generally e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Se-
lection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
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from the policyholder amounts paid for non-covered portions of the claim.93
To justify this proposition, they again invoke a sophistical explanation. Ac-
cording to the Reporters, the current practice is not to seek recoupment, so
non-recoupment must be efficient.94 They admit that this proposal is contrary
to the Restatement of Restitution95 and that courts are split on the question.6
They again invoke "special insurance law reasons"97 without explaining what
those are. But they admit that, if adopted, the rule "may mean that insurance
premiums are somewhat higher than they would be under an alternative, pro-
recoupment default rule."9
The Reporters, however, also propose that, in the context of settlement
discussions that fail, insurers must bear the burden of all subsequent punitive
damages judgments against policyholders or insureds, as well as damages for
other losses such as emotional distress and harm to business reputation.99
These proposals are controversial (for good economic reasons), and the Re-
porters concede that they do not have the majority of jurisdictions behind
them. '0 Again, without serious analysis, they support the proposition on the
simple grounds of protecting policyholders.
There are two serious problems with these proposals. First, most
(though not all), insurance policies exclude coverage of punitive damages
judgments against policyholders or insureds.'l' There are good economic rea-
sons for such an exclusion, especially in personal policies. Punitive damages
are typically levied against individuals who have committed willful, mali-
cious, or heinous acts, within the control of the policyholder, not the insurer.
Such acts can more effectively be reduced by the policyholder. What is
gained by making the insurer-and the inclusive risk pool-liable for the
harms caused by such acts, rather than putting the burden on the egregious
policyholder? Willful, malicious, or heinous acts are not probabilistic and
would not want to be insured against by normal policyholders.
Second, and even more tellingly, many jurisdictions prohibit the insur-
ance of punitive damages on grounds of public policy: offenders should bear
the costs of their offensive behavior, not be insulated by being insured for
them."°2 The Reporters purport to overturn the laws of these states, again, by
invoking the need to protect policyholders.
93 Discussion Draft, supra note 6, § 25(2) (manuscript at 119).
94 Id. at § 15, cmt. a (manuscript at 122-23). The Reporters do not consider the costs of litigation
over recoupment relative to the gains in making this (unsupported) empirical assertion.
95 See id. at § 25, cmt. d (manuscript at 125).
96 See id. at § 15, Reporter's Note, cmt. d (manuscript at 128-30).
97 Id. at § 25, cmt. d (manuscript at 125).
98 Id. at § 2, cmt. c (manuscript at 123).
99 Discussion Draft, supra note 6, at § 27, cmts. a-b (manuscript at 137-39).
100 Id. at § 27, cmt. d (manuscript at 143).
101 See George L. Priest, Insurability andPunitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1009, 1011-12 (1989).
102 See id
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Requiring coverage for alleged damages from other foreseeable harms,
such as emotional distress, harm to business reputation, among other possible
claims, suffers a similar problem.°3 The Reporters propose that the breach of
the contractual duty to settle should be treated as a tort.
0 4
The acquisition of insurance is a financial or business activity. The
breach of a duty to settle a claim, after adjudication or settlement to be fully
compensated by the insurer, is a breach of a contract, not a defamation nor a
personal injury that causes physical pain and suffering.
I do not need to emphasize the radicalism of these views. My point is
simply that the inclusion of punitive damages or damages for alleged losses
such as emotional distress will affect the judgments paid by insurers who
either have excluded punitive damages coverage or are in jurisdictions that
refuse punitive damages coverage on grounds of public policy and will in-
crease insurance payouts which will diminish insurance availability. This is
obviously true if punitive damages and damages for other intangible losses
are included in judgments or settlements. The Reporters sum up their discus-
sion of insurers' obligations to settle, clearly indicating their insensitivity to
expanding insurance availability: "[M]inimization of liability insurance pre-
miums is not the primary objective of the duty to make reasonable settlement
decisions."'' 5
CONCLUSION
Professors Baker and Logue sought in the ALI's Principles project to
suggest rules for insurance law that promoted the position of policyholders.
The Principles project reflects these ambitions, which I view as entirely ad-
mirable as aspirations, though not fully discussed in the academic literature
and, to my view, insufficiently attuned to the economics of insurance.
Though the project was transformed into an ALI Restatement, and now,
Discussion Draft, the Reporters have continued their efforts, in many in-
stances regardless of the law of the states that often conflicts with their pro-
posals.
In my view, regrettably, the Reporters have not sufficiently considered
the economics of the insurance process in formulating their proposed rules.
Believing that insurance consists principally of shifting risks, they continue
to seek to shift risks in favor of policyholders, despite the market allocation
of risks in current insurance contracts.
These efforts, if adopted, will reduce insurance availability generally
and, especially, for the low income in the society.
103 Discussion Draft, supra note 6, at § 27 cmt. a-b (manuscript at 137-39).
104 Id. at § 27, cmt. b (manuscript at 138-39).
105 Id. at § 24, cmt. g (manuscript at 99).
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Liability insurance is an extraordinarily important service in our society,
indeed in any society. Proposals that diminish insurance availability do not
enhance the possibilities of broader activities by members of the society.
